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BOOK REVIEWS
Land Ownership and Use: Cases, Statutes and Other Materials.
CuRTIs J. BERGER. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Com-
pany. 1968. Pp. xxii, 1055. $14.00.
This casebook, designed for use in a basic first-year course in the
law of property, is divided, like Gaul, into three parts. The first and
tiniest part is designed to give the neophyte a sense of how sweeping
and slippery is the very concept "property." Excerpts from the Civil
Rights Bill of 1966, and from the debates concerning it, illuminate
the emotional charge latent in the assertion, "It's my house." Bentham
is paraded about to illustrate that "property" and "law" are mutually
dependent phenomena. The Willow River Power case is then thrown
into the equation to highlight the dangers of semantic confusion, con-
ceptual booby-traps and superficial verbal analysis that await the stu-
dent. Further cases ram home the palpable truth that "property" in-
dudes not merely land, but the attempt to monopolize the fruits of
land, and that it encompasses personal ideas and business advantages,
to say nothing of the attempt to capitalize upon the cash value of a
unique personality. Counterpoint to this droll inventory of asserted
bourgeois "property rights," an excerpt intended to summarize the
equivalent Soviet approach is appended.
The second part of the book, labelled "Formation of Interests
in Land," is itself subdivided into three sections. The first of these is
really a truncated exegesis through the estate system which omits
history and future interests. The second section deals with estates
created "by operation of law," namely, adverse possession and marital
interests. The third section is simply landlord and tenant.
The third part of the book is captioned "Allocation and Develop-
ment of Land Resources." Again these materials are subdivided into
three sections. The first is devoted to the lore of convenants and
easements. The second deals with waste, lateral support and nuisance.
The third, running from pages 591 to 1033, is nothing more nor less
than a basic collection of land-use planning cases and materials.
In order quickly to get a feel for this book, let us assume that six
credit hours are appropriated for the first-year course in Property. As-
sume further a traditional academic calendar with two semesters, and
the book breaks down very easily into two major components. The first
1 p. 23. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
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semester can readily be devoted to a basic ramble through the tra-
ditional terrain of real property if the teacher couples the first two
parts of the book with the middle section of the third part. According
to my abacus, this works out to 412 pages. This leaves the class free
in the second semester to tackle both private and public land-use
controls, entailing some 619 pages. In short, we have on our hands a
ruthlessly cut-down vehicle designed to speed through a one semester
version of old-fashioned Real Property, which pulls behind it a large
trailer designed to move land-use planning bag and baggage into the
first-year curriculum.
The old-time property law fan, if such a creature there be, must
by now be reminded of Conan Doyle's famous enigmatic clue:2 obvi-
ously something does not happen during the first semester in order
to clear the track for the second one. History and future interests we
have already logged on the casualty report. Personal property is like-
wise ready for the graves registration squad. More disconcerting, how-
ever, is the list of those missing in action: sale contracts, deeds, and
the recording system. Professor Berger, anticipating that these latter
gaps in the ranks may cause a morale problem, explains that they
have been sent back to regroup themselves in the upper-class reserves.
"Conveyancing," after all, "does not belong in the first-year curricu-
lum," because the first-year student is not up to handling the tax
and finance problems inherent in modern real estate transactions. 4
Furthermore, the whole thing is better disposed of in an advanced
problem-course setting where the student has a hand in simulated
negotiations and drafting.
How does this book compare with its competitors? Clearly the
2 A. C. DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPL=T Sis~ocK HOLMES 397 (1938):
"Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
"That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes.
3 P. ix.
4 As we have seen, Professor Berger prefers to cover land-use planning instead. Pro-
fessor Bergin observes, however:
During this current year, I have been experimenting with a third-year sem-
inar on urban development ...
To my chagrin, I must now report that the seminar has proven to be a hope-
less bust .... In order to make the seminar successful, I needed solid competence
as an economist and a decisional theorist, and I had neither.
Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REv. 637, 647
(1968).
Quaere: How much are the first-year students going to get out of land-use planning if,
as I think he is, Bergin is right?
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best book to get opposite Berger is the Casner and Leach classic5
wherein the lads are inoculated with a healthy dose of personal
property before they are sent on a rigorous safari through the estate
jungle and are then coerced over an obstacle course constructed out
of conveyancing conundrums. Apart from Euclid( and Nectow, 7 this
opus asmumes that the student will get hi5 land-use planning elsewhere,
presumably in an upper-class elective course built around either the
Haar 8 or Mandelker 9 books.
If, arbitrarily, we can set the Berger book to the left and Casner
and Leach to the right, the center of the stage is occupied by two other
volumes, Both the Browder 0 and the Cribbet"- books cover traditional
ground a la Casner and Leach, but both interlard some land-use
materials a la Berger, Indeed, Browder's double-columned Babylonian-
sized monster has enough land-use material in it that, by pruning
early in the course, a teacher could produce an ersatz version of the
Berger approach. Suffice it to say, anyone eager to emulate Berger
would be better advised to use the Berger book. As a practical matter,
therefore, either the Browder or Cribbet books will serve well for
anyone who wants to rehearse traditional property but who also deems
it his duty to expose his students to the broad, introductory sophistries
associated with contemporary land-use planning.
Sitting to the left of center is Krasnowiecki's 12 book. Apart from
gifts, personal property has been exorcised in order to make room for
some basic land-use materials. Unlike Berger, this book respects history
and provides an extremely fascinating introduction to the estate system.
Like Berger, however, conveyancing is dropped out of the property
spectrum, although the last chapter, seemingly an afterthought, does
cover problems associated with the sales contract, In light of the
author's home base in Philadelphia, where title insurance is very
strong, the absence of conveyancing may be understandable, 8 but
5 A. CAsNER & W. LEcs, CASES ON PROPERTY (1st rev. ed. 1964).
8 Id. at 1021. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926),
7 CAsNER & LEAcH, supra note 5, at 1033. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928).
8 C. HAAR, LAND-UsE PLANNING. A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, AND RE-usE OF
URBAN LAND (1959).
9 D. MANDEJKER, MANAGING OuR URBAN ENVIRONiMENT: CASES, TEXT & PROBLEMS (1966).
10 0. BROWDER, R. C1/VNtINGHAM & R. JuLIN, BASIC PROPERTY LAw (1966).
11 J. CaIBLT, W, F~tz g C. JOHNSON, CASES on rROiPETy (2d ed. !966).
12 J. KRASNOWIECKI, CASES ON OWNERSHIP AND DEELOPMENT OF LAND (1965).
18 See, e.g., Roberts, Urban Conveyancing Techfiqufs in 4rericq; The Story Behind
Title Insurance, 27 CONVEY. (n.s.) 240, 240-41 (1963); Payne, A Typical Hotusq Pprchaso
Transaction in the United States, 30 CowVmY. (ns) 194, 194 n2 (1966).
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if adopted elsewhere, the book does presuppose a later course in
conveyancing.
Not mentioned thus fat, of course, has been Lefcoe's book.14
Rather than attempt to put it on the same stage with the others, it
is best left outside the pale. This is not to denigrate the book, much
less to ignore it. Rather, the Lefcoe piece deserves special treatment in
terms of the Harvard-Yale cream puff slinging game of the 1967-68
season.14 The rules of this game were elementary. The Harvard team
had to seize an object called Lefcoe, run the length of the field with
it and dump it in a quagmire denominated "fudge." The Yale team
had to seize the same object, run the length of the field in the opposite
direction, and set it atop a pedestal labelled "clarity." Needless to
say, it was a hard-fought contest highlighted by the brilliant signal
calling of the respective captains Roy L. Pkosterman, Harvard Law '58,
and Ira Michael Heyman, Yale Law '6.
As luck would have it, Harvard won the coin toss and elected
to run with the object. Clever rascals that they were, the Cambridge
crowd called as their first play the old Terminological Wizardry Play.
In an instant they shattered the Eli morale with a series of dazzling
feints-"Gigantiasis,"16 ,,SurVeyitig ,,17 "Noncasitis,' ' 8 "Anlticasitis,"19
-- before they smashed over center with a rousing "Antibasitis" 20 Har-
vard might have gained even more yardage had not the Yale captain
quickly rattled off perceptive signals, calling for the Verbal Puffing
Counter-Play-"skill and zest,""1 "very good," 2 "brilliantly,"'23 and
ultimately, "fascinating." 24
Coming out of the huddle quickly, Harvard lined up for its next
play. In measured staccato the attack was renewed with a call for the
really rough It's a Trot Play with the incantation of "definitively-lay
it-out,125 "soporific," 2d "recipe for baking a cake"-27 and "for the shelf
14 G. LEFCOE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW: CASES AND MATMuAtS (1966).
i A blistering battle of book reviews esulted from the publication of Lefcoe's work.
See Heyman, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J, 1260 (1968); Prostermank, Book Review, 52 Coat
NEL L.Q. 479 (1967).
iU Prosterman, supra note 15, at 470.
1i Id. at 480.
19 Id. at 481.
19 Id. at 482.
20 Id. at 485.
2 Hteyman, supra note 15, at 1260.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1263.
24 Id. at 1260, 1267.
25 Prosterman, supra note 15, at 481.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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of the practitioner." 2 For a moment it appeared that the entire Yale
line was about to collapse into an embarrassed foetal-like posture,
but their captain quickly recovered control by calling for the You
Missed the Point Play with "hypotheticals are probing,"29 "cross-
references demand searching thought,"30 "book is challenging," '8 1 and
ultimately, "A careful reading . . . uncovers considerable materials
eminently useful to develop the desired thought-processes. " 32
Why the Lefcoe book should have precipitated such a silly and
unproductive brawl is pretty much a matter of conjecture. It is as good
a guess as any, however, that much of the uproar was caused by the
book's direct challenge to the classic notion that the first year of law
school should be devoted to case analysis and even then only to
analysis of cases which contain the doctrinal lore served up as "Property
Law," "Torts," or "Contracts." True enough, casebooks over the last
dozen years have been injected with heavier and heavier doses of
"notes" so that today's casebook either is half a hornbook or half a lot
of show-off questions and citations which illustrate that the authors
are grinds. Lefcoe, however, had to go off and try to create a functional
book for today's market, which necessitated reflecting a pot pourri of
urban renewal, broker's contracts, mortgage interest rates, subdivision
convenants, etc., in a mix of cases, newspaper extracts, statutes and
plain dishing-up of rules.
It should be borne in mind that Lefcoe's book was designed for
a school that held property back until the second semester of the first
year and then ran it through the second year along with commercial
law and the other boring slabs of market-oriented stuff typical of the
second year. Even so, Lefcoe had invaded the first year with alien
techniques and that is what caused the fireworks.
Berger's book is not another Lefcoe, although the book has already
gotten a review in the provinces rehearsing the Harvard strategy used
against Lefcoe.83 Lefcoe tried, successfully or not, in one wild package
to tell it like it is about property, but in so doing had to pull property
back somewhat from its usual first rank as an introductory course.
Berger has tried to keep property squarely in the first year by doctoring
the table of contents of the whole property package, i.e., moving land-
use planning into the first year and kicking sales upstairs into the
28 Id. at 485.
29 Heyman, supra note 15, at 1265.
30 Id.
81 Id. at 1268.
82 Id. at 1264-65 n.7.
33 Bartke, Book Review, 14 WAYNE L. Rav. 1030 (1968).
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later years of the curriculum. Thus, the Lefcoe book raised a challenge
to the merits of the whole ordering of the curriculum, where, I suspect,
the Berger book allows the first-year property professor to keep his
course popular by making it contemporary without going through
the fuss of approaching the ubiquitous curriculum committee.
If the reader is the property department of some rural law school,
then there is a great deal to be said for Berger because one can always
purport to cover conveyancing later. If, however, a colleague already
teaches an advanced land-use or local government law course, the Ber-
ger book may be something of a Trojan Horse designed to expedite
a Pearl Harbor approach to curriculum reform. That is, by exercising
the instructor's option to adopt a "basic" property book, the instruc-
tor can tear the guts out of his colleagues' courses and, better yet,
leave them the option of cutting bait or fishing in the murky waters
of a course dedicated to conveyancing.
What is one to make of all this? First, I submit, one must question
the whole idea of reviewing casebooks on their merits because, frankly,
the publishers of all of the books we have canvassed would gladly
forward a free copy of their wares to any property teacher. Thus, as-
suming the property clan is perfectly able to compare these several
books and assay their own local curricula, any point-by-point analysis
of Berger's book is presumptuous. Thus, if there be any point to this
kind of review, barring another Harvard-Yale game, the reviewer
must try to set the Berger book in context for the non-property crowd.
Immediately I have two cynical reactions to the Berger book.
First, it is becoming popular now to make law contemporary so as to
appeal to the interest of the emotionally overcharged bourgeois
children who now go to law school and who excuse their enlistment
in the ranks of the Establishment by insisting upon studying law "as
it is." I must confess that I suspect the popular, i.e., contemporary,
since it does include "law and order," Mayor Daley, and our love of
materialism. Second, every law professor at heart wants to teach Con-
stitutional Law and, I suspect, the last half of Berger's book is just
another way of teaching it. This, however, only proves that the author
of this review is "over thirty" and hence a suspect creature.
On a more realistic plane, however, I must confess that my own
Slantist views cause me to abhor the Berger book, not in itself but as
a symptom of modem trends. [For the benefit of the politically unin-
formed reading this, a Slantist is a Catholic with Marxist leanings.] 4
34 See, e.g., Mulhearn, Book Review, THE Cxuc, Aug.-Sept. 1968, at 72.
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The Berger book massacres history, out of which any critical faculty
.must be forilated, in favor of modern f-nctionalis.. Thnctiona1ism,
however, by the very fact that it centers attention on the "as is" without
providing any frame of reference, destroys the overall citical faculty,
Thus, my gripe really boils down to this; The Berger book revels in
landuse planning lore, the purely market-oriented moonshine of this
republic, and almost purposefully destroys the long-range critical per-
spective of the student. I, for one, do not think the "as is" popularity
inherent in this book justifies the sacrifice,
Let me, however, discard what most readers of thi4 review will
label political prejudice of an unacceptable sort, and return to the
mainstream of conventional observation. Berger, on the idea of sub-
stituting contemporary woes for old woes, reflects the current law
school craze to offer "meaningful" courses. The ghetto, the poor,
ecology, etc., are now captions popping up in every respect4ble catalog.
in this regard, the Berger approach is in the mainstream. Still, the law
schools, if they are going to readjust their curricula in light of contem-
porar woes, are going to have to answer two fundamental questions,
First, and again the breader must pardon me for reflecting my own
perverse political prejudices, are the lawyers going to continue to be
the commissars of capitalism? I say this because it is my own thesis
that the so-called rule-of-law syndrome is directly related to the Whig
rise to power after 1688 and the ultimate supremacy of the ideology of
laissez-faire05 Setting aside the New Deal mutation which saw the white
4 See Fairlie, Evolutipn of a Term, TiE NEW YO KER, Oct. 19, 1968, at 173. Fairlie,
onetime leader writer for The Times and columnist in The Spectator, coined the ter1
"the Establishment." Interestingly enough, he and his angry young friends had little love
for what they thought was the "Whig lie."
The whole "'1stablishment" that the Whigs had erected and maintai~iid for two
hundred years, and that was still perpetuated in the prevailing ideas and institu-
tions of the country, was our enemy. The rights of property, the common law,
the Established Church, the vulgar little monarchy brought fr9m Hanover, a
landed class that was irelevant but still influential, a moneyed class that feared
enterprise because that would disturb its hold on the City, a governing class that
wished merely to play Box and Cox in office, and the characteristic Whig invext-tion of semi-pfficial bodies, such as the B.B.C., where valuable h.angers-on ,onl
serve the Whig lie-all these seemed to us to be the cause of the irreligion of
England, which had been tolerable while wealth and power were guarantees of
spaciousness but Was pot now that we felt our country on the Gadarene slope.
Id. at 184.
Mr. John Raymond was intellectually the most daring among us in his in-
sistence, night after night, that the common law had replaced religion in England
and that in the secular idols erected or sustained under the common law could
be found the cause of most of our evils. His vehemence against Edward core, for
&o long held up by Whig histprans as the greatest .ommon lawyer of all time and
one of the founders of English liberties, was almost personal, as if Coke were still
alive.
Id. at 182.
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urban proletariat catapulted into the "imiddle ctlass," the mainstream
of America has evolved into establishmentarian eapltalism, albeit now
collectivized for the benefit of the managerial-elitist class in industry
and government. The question, therefore, is whether the law schools
are going to provide lawyers prepared to grapple with this phenom-
enon objectively or to produce flunkies to serve in its neo-feudal
hierarchical ranks? The Berger book, with its conventional portrayal
of law designed to insure lily-white surburbia and commercially viable
center city, would indicate that the old wine is being poured into new
bottles
Second, assuming my prejudice that lawyers are by and large
mirror-image commissars, the question is whether the Berger book
reflects a real effort to rethink curricula. Again my own response
borders on despair. Granted any casebook is now replete with vast
servings of rules qua information, this book reflects the same old tripe,
namely, cases, excerpts, and notes designed as offerings at the altar of
the conventional dual-headed divinity of legal education-the Socratic
System and the division of law into "property, .... tort," "procedure,"
or what have you. The novelty of the book is the effort to put land-use
planning into the property pigeonhole immediately. This is justified
because it is "functional," i.e., this is "where the action is." My gripej
therefore, is that in their current rush to become "functional," rational-
ized as an effort to be "with it," the law schools are bent upon divorcing
themselves from their real duty to provide their products with the
crucial mark of civilized man-perspective Second, the law schools,
more or less, but mostly more, are still in the best servile manner
emulating Harvard circa 1898. Thus we come to the paradox inherent
in this reviewer's complaints; that is, he wants to junk the whole tra-
ditional curriculum and yet he will not buy, bag and baggage, the
contemporary mania to be ahistorical.
Interestingly enough, both a Catholic and a Communist must
respect history and cannot immerse himself in the purely contemporary.
But the ultimate irony is that the new car salesman, peddling thd
latest model, best reflects the current American educational scene.
The lawyer, at least as I know the lawyer, interested in maintaining
institutions by gradually modifying them to respond to change, seems
best served by the historical tradition. Thus, I suggest the ultimate
paradox: The custodians of the capitalist tradition and the training
schools of its commissars are now bent upon destroying the one faculty
which would enable their product properly to service the institution
for which they have been trained to serve. For myself, I am not sorry
1969]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
about this, but I find it difficult to respect the intelligence of my capi-
talist colleagues who take their reforms seriously.
As an educator devoid of politics, if such creature there be, let
me add yet another quaere: Why should there be casebooks if you ac-
cept functionalism? Admittedly, the world does not divide into "torts,"t
"property," or "procedure." Why not then divide the curriculum into
areas based upon skills, i.e., case law nitpicking, statutory gamesman-
ship, etc., or redesign the curriculum conceptually into "Sales: Chattels,
Realty, or Stock," "Transmission of Wealth with the Least Tax Con-
sequences," etc? The answer is that no casebooks are available to
implement any totally new curricular approach which does not, by and
large, reflect the contemporary pigeonholes. The answer to this, how-
ever, is simple. The publishers should begin to produce in volume
inexpensive separate copies of all of the cases and key segments of
the important statutes, and gear a computer system to an offset printing
plant. Then let each faculty fix its own division of materials, let each
member of it order a set of materials for his course by catalog number
and, when the pages are delivered, let the student put them into a loose
leaf notebook, and then we should really have something.
By way of conclusion, therefore, let me say that I think that Berger
has done an interesting job. Beyond that, it must be the choice of each
property teacher, insofar as he has freedom of choice, to select his own
book. Let each of them examine Berger seriously. Beyond this, how-
ever, no one can speak to the merits or demerits of this book as a case-
book. The ultimate decision is governed by each reader's view of the
proper ordering of curricula, the function of law schools, and the role
of lawyers. I suggest, however much we all like to insist that we are pro-
ceeding rationally, that this is not really a question of abstract choice,
but rather a gut-response predetermined by our political consciousness.
To some the Berger book may mark the salvation of property as a sig-
nificant item in the lawyer's intellectual armory. For me the same book
chalks up yet another item in the indictment of lawyers as partisans
of a particular brand of ideology-establishmentarian capitalism.
E. F. Roberts*
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